I couldn't write a complete overview of drones even if I wanted to. But the first two chapters often get shortchanged in the current media feeding frenzy over a leaked drone memo.
Chapter 1. Finding and exploiting an opponent's weakness. On the surface, Chapter 1 has little to do with drones, but everything to do with the broader context in which they get deployed. The "war on terror," as Bush 43 put it, better framed by Obama as the mission to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda," relies on two sets of rules: the rules of law enforcement and the rules of warfare. Critics question whether the drone program properly follows those sets of rules. That's a fair question, and it's good that the press have gone beyond blandly reporting drone strikes as if they were a common weather pattern. We are great at law enforcement, and we are great at warfare; it stands to reason we should set high standards for both. But while our gumshoes and GIs have no peer, neither set of rules is well-suited to disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda, a mission whose merit no one questions.
The rules of law enforcement assume that all countries have the means and the will to enforce laws, and that the focus should be on building cases, not preventing crime.
The rules of warfare assume uniformed soldiers sponsored by countries. Deadly force gets employed based on split-second decisions by all, even the lowliest private.
Al Qaeda's asymmetric tactics fit neither set of rules. That is not a coincidence.
A common military strategy is to attack along the seam between two opposing forces, since coordination difficulties will ensure that that is the weakest point along a war front. In seeking to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda, we employ two strategies, a military one and a law enforcement one. The weakest point is the seam between the two.
Indeed that seam is the weakness al Qaeda seeks to exploit. They don't wear a uniform, and they're not sponsored by any state. That would suggest they are common criminals, where the rules of law enforcement apply. But they gravitate toward countries where the rule of law is tenuous, at best. In that seam between the two sets of rules, we inherit the disadvantages of both and the advantages of neither.
Chapter 2 - Drone capabilities. Into this foggy milieu enter drones, unmanned planes carrying cameras and missiles, controlled by U.S. pilots in Nevada or another remote location. Before gnashing teeth over who is a legitimate target, when, under what conditions, and most of all, who gets to decide, one needs to read Chapter 2, which covers the four game-changing capabilities drones bring to the mission. These capabilities have profound implications for developing new rules that address the threats that have emerged out of the subtle weaknesses of the current two-pronged (law enforcement and warfare) regime.
Section 2.1: Drones are unmanned. Well, duh. But this has huge implications for rules of engagement. The critical problem with deploying troops to trouble spots is that they have to be given the right to defend themselves. If fired upon, fire back! Self-defense, however, means that people can get hurt, and it's not always the bad guys. Innocent civilians and your own troops can get killed. With drones, self-defense is irrelevant.
Section 2.2: Surveillance. Lost in the debate about deadly force delivered via drone is the fact that the most powerful "weapon" carried by a drone is a camera. In fact, most drones, which range in size from hand-held to a take-off weight exceeding a half dozen cars, are unarmed. The most famous drone strike, which targeted and killed Anwar al-Awlaki, was likely preceded by hundreds if not thousands of hours of drone surveillance. Regardless of the preferences of hawks as well as doves, we can expect the typical drone strike approval to require more intelligence.
Section 2.3: Time for deliberation. By providing staggering amounts of data over prolonged time periods, continuous drone monitoring imposes an obligation, moral if not legal, for extended analysis and deliberation. In World War II General Eisenhower would have rightly objected to having every shoot/don't shoot decision approved by an "informed, high-level official." No such excuse exists for drones, where the decision to strike can play out over hours if not days and involve gigabytes of data. Ultimately, if the right decision-making process involves approval from a dozen officials, digital drone technology supports it.
Section 2.4: Small, precise munitions. Conventional wisdom holds that the U.S. military seeks to build weapons that make bigger and bigger explosions. In reality, for the most part they are obsessed with building smaller weapons wielding less destructive power that limit collateral damage. This won't comfort people who follow in the footsteps of Anwar al-Awlaki, who everyone agrees got what he deserved. But it reduces collateral damage. Small, precise munitions make it harder to justify collateral damage as a necessary side-effect of hitting a legitimate target.
Given the two discreet sets of rules we can bring to bear, disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda is a difficult challenge. The unique capabilities of drones will help us meld the rules of law enforcement and the rules of warfare into a new hybrid set of rules that eliminates the seam al Qaeda is currently exploiting.
Update: Last year an article in the New York Times discussed some advantages of drones.
Update #2: Mark Bowden has a thoughtful article in the Atlantic.
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